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SOLVING THE DILEMMA OF WORK
INCENTIVES UNDER THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY & SUPPLEMENTAL
SECURITY INCOME PROGRAMS
David S. Whalen
I. INTRODUCTION
Paul Longmore, a 42 year old California native, has
no use of his arms or legs because of polio and at night
he must sleep with a ventilator. His disability, however, has
not prevented him from working towards his goal of achiev-
ing at least partial independence After earning a doctorate
in history and completing ten years of research, he recent-
ly finished a biography on George Washington, which is
expected to yield $10,000 in royalties.!
A problem arose when Longmore learned that his book
royalties would be considered 'unearned' income. As a Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI)2 recipient, Longmore
jeopardized his continued eligibility by receiving royalties
because they exceeded the program's limits on unearned
income.3 While Longmore could manage the loss of cash
assistance which the program provided, his loss of medi-
cal benefits was intolerable. In California, SSI eligibles are
provided automatic qualification for Califomia's Medicaid
program, a needs based medical assistance program. Long-
more receives in excess of $20,000 in essential medical as-
sistance each year, including personal care assistance and
rental of his ventilator. Without such support, he would be
compelled to live in a nursing home-at greater expense
to taxpayers. 4
Paul Longmore's story illustrates the frustation and
risks that disabled persons confront when they attempt to
work while remaining part of the nation's major federal pro-
grams which support the disabled-Supplemental Securi-
ty Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability (SSD).
Longmore, a leader in focusing attention on reform efforts,
burned a copy of his book to protest these laws which block
opportunity. His efforts, along with those of Rep. Steven
Bartlett of Texas and other advocacy groups, have increased
work opportunities for people with disabilities.
For example, under the SSI program, discussed in fur-
ther detail below, recipients historically would have been
denied program eligibility because of work efforts. Now they
may earn far greater incomes then ever before and remain
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eligible for vital medical benefits and "special SSI cash pay-
ments" if needed because of the new §1619 amendments.-
These amendments incorporate, in part, a new formula, set
forth below, which may individualize a person's earnings
threshold for continued eligibility. Historically, recipients
could be terminated from the SSI program based on earn-
ings without regard to actual benefits that would be lost,
including medical benefits. The new amendments correct
this harshness.
Employment opportunities for disabled persons are in-
creasing. A remarkable fact is that over the past five years,
machines have become available allowing the disabled to
talk, listen, teach, communicate, and translate to a far great-
er extent, rapidly clearing away many major workplace hur-
dles. Combining new sophisticated devices with enhanced
educational opportunities and rehabilitation programs, as
well as enlightened societal attitudes, enables far greater
realization of human resources from a segment of society
which has largely been untapped.6 The widespread availa-
bility of the personal computer, for example, and its en-
hancements over the past decade, has been a major reason
for recent change' It has 'almost single-handedly delivered
the disabled from the Dark Ages"8 In response to such ad-
vances, the availability of work incentives will become in-
creasingly important.
II. A FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION:
HOW TO DEFINE 'DISABILITY'?
Before examining the relevant disability programs, it
is necessary to review the legislative evolution of the con-
cept of disability to understand its current application. To-
days definition was conceived at the inception of the Social
Security Administration's first disability program in 1954.9
However, the first program was not designed specifically
for the disabled. The intent of Congress was to bolster the
needs of elderly workers who were forced into early retire-
ment because they were no longer able to work due to to-
tal disability. Thus, the design of the program was to enable
older workers to avoid work in compelling situations. Once
these individuals became eligible for the program, they were
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no longer expected to work. The goal of this initial
program-to enable early retirement-conflicts with pro-
gram policies fostering work incentives.
Because the first type of benefits was aimed at older,
retiring workers, the benefits were not in the form of cash
disbursements as they are today. In 1954, Congress first
instituted legislation protecting retirement benefits for per-
sons who had substantial work histories.'0 In 1955, Con-
gress established the disability insurance trust fund, and
the disability insurance program became effective in July
of 1957." In 1960, the age limitation for Social Security
Disability Insurance was eliminated.
2
The concept of disability embodied in current law
"represents a politically fashioned compromise at any given
time and place about the legitimacy of claims to social aid""3
In the early 1950s, a deep-seated legitmacy of benefits sole-
ly for disabled persons was lacking. There was opposition
to creating a new program specifically for disabled persons.
In order to overcome opposition, proponents of disability
insurance initially presented their proposal as a modifica-
tion of the retirement program in the form of a reduction
in the retirement age of disabled persons.'
4
Part of the disability definition adopted in the early
1950s rests on an individual's inability to engage in sub-
stantial gainful activity (SGA).'5 SGA ties the definition of
disability to the individual's ability to work and receive earn-
ings. SGA is characterized as work activity which involves
significant physical or mental activities for pay or profit,
providing it is the kind of work usually done for pay or
profit.'6 In most cases, average earnings of $500 per month
are considered SGA.!7 In determining whether or not the
$500 SGA figure is actually being achieved under the SSI
and SSD programs, disabled workers are able to deduct
certain impairment related work expenses. These expenses
comprise the reasonable cost of items and services need-
ed to work as a result of a disability.'
8
The SGA test is only part of the disability requirement.
Additionally, the definition requires the showing of medi-
cal evidence For individuals with severe disabilities in thir-
teen different .categories, medical evidence alone establishes
a presumption that such individuals are unable to engage
in SGA without further inquiry. 9
On the other hand, claimants with less severe disabil-
ities fall under a modification to the disability definition
adopted in 1978.20 The Social Security Act requires that
such persons must "not only [be] unable to do his previous
work but [must be unable], considering his age, education,
and work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of sub-
stantial gainful work which exists in the national econo-
my, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied
for work, 2 ' These guidelines incorporate "grid regulations"
which are intended to function as a means of objectifying
the SGA portion of the disability assessment. They are
based on a matrix of four factors including physical ability,
age, education, and work experience, and are intended to
eliminate the need for vocational experts to conduct eligi-
bility assessments.
III. BACKGROUND
Before discussing significant new opportunities for dis-
abled individuals to work, it is essential to outline the struc-
ture of the SSI and SSD programs as well as their collateral
medical assistance provisions, Medicaid and Medicare.
More importantly, readers should be aware that work op-
portunities differ greatly depending upon which program
the eligible person qualifies for and that the underlying pur-
poses of both programs differ significantly as well. Section
1619 is only one of many laws enabling work opportunities.
The term "disability" has been used broadly so far. It
is worthwhile to note that the variety and types of disabili-
ties vary significantly between SSI and SSD. Under the SSI
program, 53 percent of the male recipients have mental ill-
ness and 10 percent have circulatory system disorders; 43
percent of the female recipients have mental disorders, 10
percent have circulatory problems, and 10 percent have
musculatory skeleton disorders.22 On the other hand un-
der SSD, 18 percent of the male recipients have mental dis-
orders, 23 percent have circulatory problems, and 15
percent have musculoskeletal disorders. Female SSD
recipients have the lowest percentage of mental disorders
at 17 percent, while 15 percent have circulatory problems
and 20 percent have musculoskeletal disorders.
23
(A) SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME (SSI)
SSI functions as a safety net for indigent, aged, blind,
and 'disabled" persons. A person with a disability under
SSI need never have worked to become eligible for pay-
ments. The program became effective in 1974, after the
repeal of a 1950 state public assistance program for needy,
aged, blind, and disabled persons. The new program created
federal control and increased opportunities for eligibility.2 4
SSI benefits include cash payments designed to assure
a basic standard of living at a minimum federal benefit lev-
el. States may build upon the Federal income base with a
state supplement so that the total amount of benefits varies
by state.25 The benefits level in 1989, for an individual liv-
ing alone, was $4,416 per year, or $368 per month.2 6 The
federal poverty income guideline level for 1989, by com-
parison, was $5,980 or $498 per month.2 The federal
benefit level in 1990 is $386 per month.28
There are important criteria for meeting initial and con-
tinued SSI eligibility. Unlike current SSI eligibles, applicants
with earnings in excess of the SGA level are ineligible. Both
applicants' and current SSI recipients' uneamed income still
must not exceed a set amount.29 The limit on unearned
income is made without regard to the severity of disability,
as illustrated by the case of Paul Longmore.
Furthermore, countable resources, which generally ex-
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clude the cost of a principal place of residence, for both
applicants and recipients, cannot exceed $2,000.30 Under
the Plan for Achieving Self-Support (PASS),31 money set
aside in a special income/resource shelter is excluded from
countable resources. This shelter is used by disabled SSI
eligibles to collect funds in order to pay for items and serv-
ices to enable such persons to work. Within certain limita-
tions, the cost of an automobile is also excluded.3 2 Lastly,
SSI recipients must continue to have the disability which
initially led to eligibility.
(B) SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY (SSD)
The Social Security Disability program is part of the
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program
(OASDI), commonly referred to as "Social Security." The
SSD component operates as a program of basic, manda-
tory government disability insurance to which workers and
employers contribute. It provides protection to persons with
substantial work histories. Additionally, workers' depen-
dents are covered.3
3
Actual benefits afforded SSI and SSD eligibles are far
greater than the program's monthly cash payments alone.
Significant medical benefits are contingent on continued
eligibility. SSI eligibles in some states may receive automatic
Medicaid coverage, while SSD eligibles may, after a two year
waiting period, receive Medicare coverage. Benefits under
Medicaid and Medicare differ and the scope is changing,
not only in light of legislative changes but through recent
judicial decisions as well.
(C) MEDICAID
Medicaid, established under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act, is an assistance program designed to pay med-
ical expenses for 'categorically needy" individuals. All states
participate in Medicaid except Arizona. Participating states
must cover eligible individuals for the following required
services: (1) hospitalization; (2) out-patient hospital serv-
ices; (3) physician services; (4) lab tests (including x-rays);
(5) nursing homes; and (6) home health care (including nurs-
ing and home care services).34 States may provide addi-
tional services.3 -
Medicaid is funded at the federal, state, and county
level. The New York State legislature budgeted over $10
billion for the New York Medicaid program for fiscal year
1989.36 While the State plans to spend $3.35 billion, the
federal government and New York counties will pick up the
balance. State legislators are concerned with the rising cost
of Medicaid, since more than half of the property tax
revenues in some New York counties are being allocated
to social services, with a large part of the spending being
attributed to increases in Medicaid. On the federal level,
New York State, with 6 percent of the U.S. population,
received 20 percent of the nation's federal Medicaid spend-
ing.3 7
In additon to categorically needy individuals, states
have the option of providing coverage to the "medically
needy.3" For these individuals, there are income and
resource tests that must be met These tests vary from state
to state3 9 In fiscal year 1986, 3.2 million individuals with
disabilities received Medicaid. Combined federal and state
expenditures totalled $14.9 billion.40
Underscoring the importance of SSI eligibility is that
SSI recipients automatically qualify for Medicaid in New
York State.4' Medicaid coverage is a substantial and neces-
sary benefit for disabled recipients. The average annual per
capita estimated Medicaid expenditure for a New York SSI
recipient is $7,851 in 1990,42 while the annualized SSI
amount in 1990 is $6,696. Thus, termination of SSI has
ramifications beyond the immediate loss of SSI benefits.
(D) MEDICARE
Medicare, with an annual budget of over $88 billion
dollars, is the primary health insurance for over 30 million
Americans. 43 The program is mainly comprised of persons
over age 65 who qualify on the basis of Old Age Survivors
and Disability Health Insurance (OASDI). In mid 1987, dis-
abled SSD beneficiaries constituted 10 percent of the Medi-
care population, numbering more than 3 million. 44
Individuals who qualify for SSD benefits, on the basis of
their parents' benefits, are also eligible for Medicare. SSD
eligibles must wait 24 months after receiving a disability
benefit in order to receive Medicare. Other persons not co-
vered by OASDI may pay a monthly premium and become
eligible.4"
There are two parts to the Medicare program. The first
part, Medicare Part A, comprises hospital insurance (HI).
The scope of benefits for eligibles includes skilled nursing
facility coverage, Home Health Care, and Hospice Care.46
The 1990 monthly premium is $175.00 for persons who
are able to buy-in. SSD eligibles do not have to pay the
premium. There are a number of other instances where Part
A participants are required to pay.47 An important benefit
to disabled individuals under the Home Health Care cover-
age is that eligibles are provided with an unlimited number
of home health care visits by skilled nurses and home health
aides, without having to pay a deductible or coinsurance
rate.
A common misconception exists that persons with
chronic illnesses are not entitled to Home Health Care
Coverage. In Duggan v. Bowen,48 the United States Dis-
trict Court in Washington, D.C., confronted the scope of
home health care coverage for Medicare-recipients. Under
Part A, home health care services are provided by home
health agencies (HHAs) which enter into agreements with
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide
health care to persons eligible for Medicare.49 "HHAs pro-
vide Part A services in patients' homes rather than in an
institutional setting for two principal reasons - first, home
services are more humane, and secondly, they are more eco-
nomical. Home health services include: part-time or inter-
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mittent nursing care provided by or under the supervision
of a registered nurse; physical, occupational or speech ther-
apy; medical social services under the direction of a physi-
cian; and part-time or intermittent services of a home health
aide.50 Under the Medicare Act, a beneficiary must meet
certain conditions to receive home health care coverage.
The patient must need skilled care while "confined to his
home.""
The issue in Duggan was whether or not the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services' interpretation of the
provision pertaining to "part-time or intermittent care," was
arbitrary and capricious. The Department interpreted the
provision as not covering home health aide services, if such
services required more than four days a week. The court
held that the four-day rule directly contravened the plain
meaning of the statute. According to the court, services may
be available in the home seven days a week and still be
considered part-time or intermittent under the statute.5 2
The second part of Medicare is Part B, Supplemen-
tary Medical Insurance (SMI).53 It is a voluntary program
whereby eligible beneficiaries who pay a monthly premi-
um ($28.60 in 1990) are entitled to reimbursement for some
physicians' services and ancillary medical expenses, includ-
ing durable medical equipment. Under Part B, Medicare
recipients are required to pay an annual $75 deductible and
a 20 percent coinsurance rate. Medicare recipients are also
required to pay the additional fee beyond the 20 percent
coinsurance rate when doctors charge above Medicare's "al-
lowable charge for the service rendered.
IV. WORK INCENTIVES
Work incentives that are available to SSD and SSI pro-
gram eligibles have been underutilized. Thus, a leading le-
gal services attorney can assert:
The best kept secret among advocates, disa-
bility benefit recipients and, yes, even among
the Social Security Administration personnel
has to be the availability of work incentives un-
der SSAs disability programs...-"
An example of an underutilized incentive is the Plan
for Achieving Self Support (PASS). The PASS "has been
in place since 1974. Unfortunately, the PASS has virtually
been ignored as a means to shelter and exclude income
and resources of the SSI applicant and recipient."' The
PASS functions as an income or resource exclusion that
allows a disabled person to set aside income or resources
for college tuition, vocational training, starting costs for a
business, work-related equipment, and other necessities
needed to achieve employment. A significant aspect of the
PASS is that it may enable an SSD eligible to establish con-
current SSD and SSI eligibility. This, in turn, enables the
eligible to set aside SSD benefits through a PASS shelter
while receiving SSI benefit payments.5 6 The accumulated
SSD benefits may then be used to purchase equipment
necessary to enter into employment.
The success of work incentives has been limited be-
cause policymakers assumed that a disabled person would
make a transition to total independence after a trial work
period. The trial work period was intended to function as
a transition period during which an individual could test
his ability to work without losing immediate support.
However, the ability to meet large annual medical expenses
accompanying severe, chronic disabilities will rarely be de-
veloped during a transition period. Moreover, SSA
proposals aimed at correcting this harshness are difficult
for recipients to understand and for SSA claims represen-
tatives to apply. The result of many current modifications
under the SSD program has been, in effect, to extend the
trial work period from 9 to 45 months. 7
(A) THE EFFECTS OF EARNINGS AND WORK
ON SSD AND MEDICARE
Presently, under SSD, the major work incentives for
disabled persons are the use of impairment related work
expenses,"8 the Plan for Achieving Self-Support, the trial
work period, the "grace period," the extended period of eligi-
bility, and the extended period of Medicare Coverage (forty-
eight months).
Once an SSD eligible earns above the SGA level, he
is not automatically terminated. An eligible is provided a
nine month trial work period where full benefits are main-
tained.5 9 After nine total months in which earnings exceed-
ing $200 are accumulated, the trial work period is
exhausted. 60 Earnings in excess of SGA after the trial work
period generally result in the individual no longer being con-
sidered "disabled" for the purposes of continued eligibility.6'
A person receives a benefit for the month in which termi-
nation occurred plus an additional two month "grace peri-
od 62
The extended period of eligibility is a consecutive 36
month term following the trial work period. If during months
3 through 36 the disabled worker's earnings for a particu-
lar month are less than the SGA level, the person is enti-
tled to a full benefit payment for that month. Earnings
greater than the SGA level result in the monthly benefit pay-
ment being reduced to zero. If earnings continue to be less
than SGA between months 3 through 36, a person can au-
tomatically resume receiving regular SSD payments.6 3 SSD
eligibles are not allowed an eamings-benefit offset similar
to the SSI program.
During the trial work period and extended period of
eligibility (forty-five months), the individual is provided with
extended Medicare coverage. 64 A major disincentive re-
mains because eligibles who want to work face a "Catch
22" situation: if they do work, they lose their health insur-
ance after forty-eight months. A newly enacted amendment
to the SSD program, however, will help alleviate this barri-
er.65 The amendment addresses the current dilemma poten-
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tial SSD workers now face by allowing SSD eligibles to
buy-in to Medicare after the forty-eight month period. For
SSD eligibles who are earning less than 200 percent of the
poverty level, Medicaid would be required to pay their Part
A premiums. But, states could require that individuals earn-
ing between 200 and 150 percent of the poverty level pay
a portion of their premiums. Persons earning over 200 per-
cent of the poverty level are required to pay their full premi-
ums.
6 6 The coverage is limited to Medicare Part A
premiums, and individuals would be subject to a resource
test that is twice the SSI level.67
(B) THE EFFECTS OF EARNINGS AND WORK
ON SSI AND MEDICAID UNDER §1619
As a result of the Employment Opportunities for Dis-
abled Americans Act of 1987,68 the trial work period and
extended period of eligibility for disabled and working SSI
eligibles were eliminated. The Act made §1619 permanent,
and eligibles no longer have benefits terminated on the ba-
sis of the SGA rule. The §1619 incentives have two essen-
tial components. First, §1619(a) 69 provides Special Cash
Benefits if the individuals earnings equal or exceed the SGA
level (now $500) but are below a breakeven point. 0
§1619(a) eligibles are automatically reinstated to regular SSI
payments when earnings drop below SGA.7' However,
§1619(a) eligibles must meet the prior month requirement,7 2
as well as all other SSI nondisability criteria.7 3 These disa-
bled workers are automatically 4 eligible for Medicaid cover-
age, so that the disincentive created from a loss of
corresponding medical benefits is removed.7 Payment
amounts are calculated the same way regular benefit
amounts are determined. 6
The second component of the §1619 work incentives
is the extension of Medicaid eligibility to disabled and work-
ing individuals who could not work but for the extension
of Medicaid coverage (§1619(b)). These individuals' earn-
ings are high enough to reduce their monthly SSI payments
to zero. Such eligibles receive "Special SSI Eligibility
Status"77 for the purposes of receiving Medicaid provided
they meet a 'Threshold Test.17 8 This test, under §1619(b),
compares gross income with either a threshold amount or
an individualized threshold.
The charted threshold amount in 1990 for New York
State is $20,199.79 Gross earnings less than or equal to
the threshold amount allow continued eligibility. If gross
earnings exceed the threshold amount, an individualized
threshold is used which takes into account even higher earn-
ings for continued eligibility.80
The charted threshold is calculated by adding a "base
amount" representing the annual gross earnings figure which
would reduce an individual's combined state and federal SSI
benefit to zero, including the recipients estimated state an-
nual average per capita Medicaid expenditure. 81 The base
amount consists of a Federal breakeven point annualized8 2
- $10,284 in 1990 - plus two times the State supplemen-
tary payment level (e.g., $2,064 for New York recipients in
1990). Thus, the base amount is $12,348 for New York
eligibles. The effect of the charted threshold is to prohibit
an individual from retaining eligibility if he has sufficient
gross earnings to replace SSI cash benefits, publicly-funded
personal care benefits, and an estimated per capita
Medicaid expenditure. 8
3
The individualized threshold enables a determination
to be made based on whether the recipient has sufficient
earnings to replace all benefits actually provided through
SSI eligibility. In some instances, individuals may have a
higher per capita Medicaid expenditure PASS, or work ex-
pense. The individualized threshold includes the following:
the base amount plus the sum of the actual expenditures
for Medicaid services received or expected for a designat-
ed 12-month period, impairment-related work expenses,84
expenditures under an approved plan for achieving self-
support,8" and publicly-funded personal attendant care. As
long as other SSI criteria are met, recipients could earn in
excess of the $20,199 charted threshold amount. Because
the new law takes into account all benefits which would
actually be lost if SSI eligibility were cut, the effect of either
calculation is to permit far greater earnings than ever be-
fore for SSI recipients.
Other Special SSI Eligibility Status criteria include the
following: the individual must (1) be under age 65, (2) con-
tinue to have the disabling impairment which enabled ini-
tial receipt of SSI, (3) continue to meet all SSI nondisability
requirements, and (4) meet the "Medicaid Use Test"8 and
"Prerequisite Month Requirement"78 §1619(b) recipients are
reinstated automatically to either §1619(a) status or regu-
lar SSI status depending on earnings level. 88
For example, if X, a disabled New York SSI eligible lived
alone with no other income, and his gross income equaled
$30,000 dollars a year in 1990, the individualized threshold
would apply. Since X had $20,000 in medical expenses and
all other SSI criteria were met, X would maintain program
eligibility because his individualized threshold of $32,348
(combining the $12,348 base amount plus the actual med-
ical expenses of $20,000) would exceed gross income.
Under the SSI program, the government must balance
the need to limit basic assistance to the needy disabled with
the need to allow program recipients to reach America's
economic mainstream. 9 Although §1619 participants will
be able to earn higher incomes, income level should effect
eligibility. By defining disability with a strict SGA earnings
limitation, SSA was assured that persons with incomes
higher than SGA would not remain on SSI when they could
provide for themselves. This policy, however, did not con-
sider the individual's actual loss of benefits and instead com-
pelled individuals who sought to work to remain dependent
on SSI and a subsistence based income.
Even though the passage of the Employment Oppor-
tunities for Disabled Americans Act of 1987 eliminated the
SGA rule, the remaining SSI criteria continue to dissuade
people who want to work. For example, if a participant
wants to work and save towards the down-payment on a
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home, a child's college education, or an Individual Retire-
ment Account, they would become ineligible for §1619 af-
ter exceeding the $2,000 limit on SSrs countable resources.
Participants are forced to spend their earnings in order to
stay below the SSI limit. In effect, financial dependence on
the program is fostered because individuals cannot build
equity.
People on §1619 "may face a bleak future' because they
rely on Medicaid for their medical care.90 Reagan era poli-
cies have shifted the financial burden from the federal
government to state and local governments. State and lo-
cal governments are either unable or unwilling to meet this
new financial burden.9 ' "[ln all states, and particularly in
recent years, the scope of services covered is a source of
continuing controversy. Few states are generous and all are
becoming increasingly willing to cut back ... to impose
cost-sharing requirements on recipients, and to utilize a var-
iety of restrictive administrative techniques"9 2 Another seri-
ous shortcoming of Medicaid is the limited reimbursement
available in most states and the resulting reluctance of many
providers to accept Medicaid patients.9 3 Similar concerns
rest with Medicare eligibles as well.94
Lastly, §1619 status also triggers an annual 'continu-
ing disability review', historically, a vulnerable point for eligi-
bles. In the early 1980s, wholesale terminations of SSD
eligibles resulted from continuing disabity reviews. The Rea-
gan Administration attempted to cut costs via a "crack
down on ineligibility. 95 Citing a General Accounting Office
(GAO) report claiming that 20 percent of the SSD
beneficiaries were actually ineligible,96 the Administration's
goal was to create $2 billion in savings.97 Governors in nine
states, including New York, halted the terminations on their
own initiative, charging that the new federal guidelines un-
fairly denied benefits to eligible recipients. 98
One factor which helped the Administration track
down ineligible beneficiaries was the change set forth in
§901 of the Social Security Disability Amendments of
1980,99 which required, beginning in January of 1982, con-
tinuing eligibility reviews at least once every three years for
persons not considered "totally disabled:' ° ° The Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, however, moved up
the date of implementation and accelerated the rate of
reviews beyond the schedule in the 1980 Amendments.'0 '
A second major factor, combined with accelerated reviews,
was that SSA introduced a stricter eligibility standard. Dur-
ing the 1970s, decreasing numbers of beneficiaries left the
benefit rolls' 2 with no corresponding overall decline in the
health of the nation's workforce. SSA's policy setting forth
standards for review were consequently questioned. The
number of continuing disability investigations increased
sharply,0 3 and the strain placed on the Social Security Ad-
ministration was enormous.0 4 From March 1981 to March
1984,470,000 SSD eligibles were terminated, with 160,000
persons later being reinstated upon appeal, and 120,000
appeals pending as of March 1984.!5 The policy from 1969
to 1975 was to continue benefits on a medical basis if the
person's condition had not improved since initial determi-
nation of medical eligibility. In June 1976, SSA issued ord-
ers to apply a stricter "current disability" standard.'0 6 The
then new standard allowed termination when a recipient
could not produce substantial evidence of continuing disa-
bility, whether or not there was evidence of actual medical
improvement. SSA was criticized because the medical
criteria in the newer standards, particularly in mental im-
pairment cases, "focused too heavily on the severity of the
medical condition without making an adequate evaluation
of the beneficiary's ability to work, with the result that
benefits were terminated for many people who cannot func-
tion in the work environment"' 7
Congress reacted to the wholesale terminations with
strong bipartisan support in opposition. Representative Fort-
ney Stark co-sponsored a bill that would place a moratori-
um on continuing disability investigations (CDIs)"'8 of the
mentally disabled until reforms were passed.0 9 Congress
instituted a temporary moratorium on mental improvement
reviews and a stricter standard requiring the government
to establish evidence that individuals' conditions "have not
medically improved to the point of ability to perform
SGA: 0 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
that the cost of the crack down to SSA was an additional
$1.4 billion dollars for 1984 through 1990 (SSA's estimat-
ed cost was $1 billion higher than CBO's)." I
V. A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF §1619
In 1978, the House passed a bill that would have in-
creased the SGA level, making it harder to lose SSI through
increased earnings! ' 2 The bill would have raised the SGA
amount by the Federal SSI "breakeven point'" 3 and dou-
bled the allowable money spent on work expenses and at-
tendant care.
The legislation would have individualized SGA and
changed the definition of disability for the SSI but not SSD.
The 95th Congress adjourned before the Senate could take
action."
4
In October 1979, the House passed a bill which was
also intended to remedy the harshness of the SGA limita-
tion by setting a higher minimum SGA level, but at the SSI
"breakeven point" only"' . The bill did not include a provi-
sion to double the allowable money spent on work expenses
and attendant care." 6 The Social Security Administration,
however, opposed changing the definition. Testifying before
the Senate Finance Committee, the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration warned that program costs
were projected to rise from $15 billion to $30 billion wi-
thin 10 years, unless measures were taken to curb spend-
ing. The Senate Committee felt it "necessary to move with
great care in addressing those disincentives to avoid mak-
ing unintended and undesirable changes in fundamental
scope and purpose of the program""' The Senate reject-
ed changing the SGA level."
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The House and Senate reached a compromise! 9 In-
stead of mandating an increase in SGA level, the bill es-
tablished the §1619 provisions as a temporary three-year
demonstration project. §1619 leaves SGA and the defini-
tion of disability unchanged. However, working disabled
eligibles under §1619, receiving earnings in excess of SGA,
were afforded either 'special eligibility status" or 'special cash
payments" if their earnings fell below the "breakeven point"
but remained above SGA. The bill was signed into law in
June of 198020
In August 1983, the Subcommittee on Public As-
sistance and Unemployment Compensation, of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, heard testimony at a hear-
ing on a bill that would make permanent the work incen-
tive provisions of §1619!2 At the hearing, SSA's Deputy
Commissioner for Programs and Policy voiced opposition
to the bill, citing the need to control escalation of the pro-
gram's costs. However, the Deputy Commissioner's oppo-
sition was criticized by members of Congress for not
considering the programs effectiveness. Before eliminating
the program, members of Congress urged further study'22
Before the Subcommittee's hearing, advocates for the
disabled had informed Congress that SSI field personnel
lacked training and knowledge of the demonstration project
and its incentives. 23 They asserted that the temporary na-
ture of the project created a weak incentive for SSA to pro-
vide extensive training to its personnel and properly inform
recipients of their §1619 benefits. The advocates further
maintained that disabled individuals were less likely to en-
gage in a temporary program and risk a cutoff of vital med-
ical and cash benefits if the demonstration project was not
extended 24 At the end of the three-year project in 1983,
there was an administrative extension by the Department
of Health and Human Services. In 1984, Congress enact-
ed an extension of §1619 until June of 1987!2 The new
law directed SSA and the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration to undertake further study of the effectiveness of
§1619.126
In 1984, Representative Steve Bartlett (R. Tex.) sought
permanent authorization for §1619, but Congress took no
action on the bill.' 27 In 1985, Bartlett, introducing another
bill,;28 once again sought permanent authorization of §1619.
Testifying at a Congressional Hearing on the bill, SSA as-
serted that until more facts were available and a better un-
derstanding of how best to encourage the disabled to work
was developed, no further action should be taken, noting
that §1619 was already authorized through June 1987!29
In 1984, the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act authorized a congressional report on §1619.!30 After
the report was completed in 1986, SSA gave strong sup-
port in making the §1619 incentives permanent' 3' The Em-
ployment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act of
1987 made the incentives permanent.
In January 1989, Congressman Bartlett reintroduced
a bill which would have brought §1619 type incentives to
SSD eligibles 32 Part of the bill's provisions - the Medi-
care Buy-in - were signed into law
33
VI. CONCLUSION
A new problem confronting Congress is not that some
persons are avoiding work and seeking early retirements.
Since 1982, there has been a 7,639 percent increase in
§1619(a) worker participation,' 34 while §1619(b) participa-
tion has increased by over 300 percent*135 The combined
§1619 incentives have allowed approximately 55,000 se-
verely disabled SSI eligibles to work - some for the very
first time.' 36 Eligibles are, in fact, seeking work where in the
past they lacked opportunity. 37 Recent changes have creat-
ed important new opportunities.
Aside from higher self-esteem and better lives for dis-
abled SSI eligibles now able to work, millions of dollars of
savings result from the reductions in benefit payments.!
3 8
Although the Social Security Administration (SSA) initial-
ly opposed §1619, §1619's track record has created sup-
port*139 Without such incentives, severely disabled persons
will be kept from America's economic mainstream, even
though technology and training opportunities could allow
these individuals to participate more fully in American so-
ciety 40 They would be compelled to rely on a subsistence-
level welfare income, because work efforts, despite severe
impairment, could disqualify entitlement to vital government
benefits. §1619 is a positive step, but it is not enough.
As a result of §1619, a disparity in work incentives has
arisen between SSI and SSD eligibles. A principal reason
for the disparity is the uneven application of the SGA rule
and the SGA termination of SSD eligibles after 45 months
of work. The new SSD Medicare Buy-in provision, however,
is a positive step in creating continued access to health in-
surance for such workers. In light of the rapid growth of
the programs, current work incentives policy must be re-
examined.' 4' Today, less than one half of one percent of
the SSD beneficiaries ever return to work, and a greater
percentage of younger workers are receiving benefits' 4 2 A
remaining disincentive in the SSD program is the unavail-
ability of an earnings-benefit offset similar to the SSI pro-
gram 43 An offset similar to the SSI program must be
added. Additionally, SSD and SSI eligibles, many in their
'prime working years" must be made aware that these im-
portant new opportunities exist 44
SPRING 1990 5,
ENDNOTES
1. Longmore, Crippling the Disabled, The New York Times, Nov. 26,
1988, § 1, at 23, col. 3; Goldman, Disabled Historian Bums Book Over
Threat to Benefits, The Los Angeles Times, Oct. 29,1988, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
2. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a means tested cash as-
sistance program for needy blind, aged, and disabled individuals. For fur-
ther discussion of SSI, see infira text accompanying notes 24-32.
3. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1120 (1988).
4. Goldman, supra note 1.
5. The work incentives added §1619 originally as a three year demon-
stration project effective January 1, 1981. The Social Security Disability
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L 96-265, 94 Stat. 445 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 section U.S.C. § 1382h). In 1983, the project was extended through
administrative order, in 1984, Congress extended §1619 until June 1987.
The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L 98-460,
98 Stat. 1794. In 1987, the §1619 incentives became permanent. The
Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act, Pub. L 99-643,
100 Stat. 3574 (codified as amended in section 42 U.S.C. section 1305.)
6. The renowned Steven Hawking is an example of such success.
He is a professor of mathematics at Cambridge University and the author
of a best-selling survey of modem cosmology. He is unable to speak, para-
lyzed by LOu Gehrig's disease A 12 pound computer that processes close
to 2,600 words at a time has helped him to communicate more effective-
ly. Daly, PCs Smooth Disabled Workers'Road to MIS, Computerworld,
Oct. 3, 1988 at 101.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L No. 83-761,
68 Stat 1052 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 et seq.).
10. The Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L No. 83-761,
68 Stat. 1052 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402-408.).
11. The Social Security Amendments of 1956, Pub. L No. 84-880,
70 Stat. 807 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-422).
12. The Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L No. 83-778,
74 Stat. 967, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423).
13. Deborah Stone, The Disabled State at 27 (1984).
14. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L No.
96-265, 1980 Legislative History, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1322.
15. Social Security Amendments of 1954, Pub. L No. 83-761, 68
Stat. 1080 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1382) (introducing the concept
of substantial gainful activity).
16. 20 C.ER. § 416.97 (1988).
17. Prior to January 1, 1990 this figure was $300.54 Fed. Reg. 53600
(1989).
18. See, Sheldon, Work Incentives for Disabled Persons Under the
Social Security and SSI Programs, 22 Clearinghouse R. 1074, 1079
(Feb. 1989).
19. 20 C.FR. § 416.934 (1988).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(a)(1988).
21. Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Campbell,
461 U.S. 458 (1983); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(a)(1988).
22. McCoy, Disabled-Worker Beneficiaries and Disabled SSI
Recipients: A Profile of Demographics and Program Characteristics, Vol.
52, Soc. Security Bull. Na 5, May, 1989, at 23.
23. Id.
24. In 1988, the Social Security Administration paid out $9.4 billion
in SSI payments to its approximately 2.9 million recipients who were blind
or disabled. Department of Health and Human Services, Report
of the Disability Advisory Council, 22(1988) [hereinafter Report of D.AC.].
25. In New York, the 1989 and 1990 supplement amount is $86 per
month. Telephone interview with a clerk in the regional office of the So-
cial Security Administration. (March 19, 1990).
26. 20 C.FR. § 416.110 (1988).
27. 52 Soc. Security Bull. No. 3, March, 1989, at 30. This figure
is for the contiguous states and the District of Columbia.
28. 20 C.FR. § 416.110 (1988).
29. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1988).
30. 20 C.FR. § 416.1205 (1988); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1212 (1988).
31. For further discussion see infra text accompanying notes 55-56,
32. 20 C.F.R. § 1218 (1988). For other exclusions of resources see
generaly, 20 CF.R. § 416.1201-66. See also, Social Security Adminis-
tration, A Summary Guide to Social Security and Supplemen-
tal Security Income Work Incentives for the Disabled and
Blind (1987) (available from the Social Security Administration Region-
al Offices).
33. In fiscal year 1987, more than 4 million people received cash
benefits in excess of $20.4 billion dollars, consisting of approximately 3
million workers and 1.3 million workers' children and spouses. Supra note
24.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 396 et seq. (1988).
35. N.Y. Social Services Law § 365-a (Consol. 1984). In New York
coverage also includes private duty nursing and prescribed visits to podi-
atrists, optometrists, and dentists. See, Herman, Medicaid Lobbyists Hogtie
Legislature, Schenectady Gazette, March 25, 1989, at 35.
36. Herman, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. 42 C.F.R. 301(a) (1988).
39. The 1986 allowable resource limit for an individual was $2,950
and the income limit was $4,900. 18 NYCRR parts 352, 360. Arizona,
on the other hand, has a federal medical assistance program that oper-
ates as a demonstration project with waivers from certain Medicaid pro.
gram requirements.
40. Report of D.A.C. supra note 24, Appendix F at 2.
41. 42 C.FR. 435.711 (1988); 42 C.FR. § 435.721 (1988); Program
Operations Manual System, (hereinafter P.O.M.S.) SI 02302.200E (inter-
nal operation manual published by the Social Security Administration).
42. P.O.M.S. SI 02302.200E.2.
43. Report of D.A.C. supra note 24 Appendix F at 2.
44. Bye, Eliminating the Medicare Waiting Period for Social Securi-
ty Worker Benefits, 52 Soc. Security Bull. No. 5, May 1989, at 2.
45. This category now includes individuals who no longer qualify for
SSD after 48 months of working above the SGA level. See Infra note 64.
46. See generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 13951-2 (1988).
47. E.g., in 1989, there was a $560 annual deductible for a hospital
stay.
48. 691 E Supp. 1487 (1988).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m)(4) (1988).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(m)(4) (1988).
51. 691 F. Supp. 1487, 1487 (1988) (citing 42 U.S.C. §1395(a)(2)(c)).
52. Id.
53. See generally, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c to 1395i-2 (1988); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1395j-1395w (1988).
54. Sheldon, supra note 18.
55. Id. at 1074 (emphasis added).
56. For examples of PASS shelters as well as further details see gener-
ally supra note 18.
57. Id. at 1080.
58. 20 C.FR. 404.1575(c). See supra text accompanying notes 17-18.
59. 20 C.F.R. 404.1592 (1988).
60. 54 Fed. Reg. 53,605 (1989).
61. 20 C.FR. § 404.1592 (1988).
62. 20 C.ER. § 404.1592(e) (1988).
63. 42 U.S.C § 402 (d)(1)(g) (1988).
64. 42 U.S.C.§ 426 (b) (1988).
65. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L No 101-239
§ 6012, 103 Stat. 2161. (1989).
66. See, H.R. Rep. No. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Report of the Committe on the Budget House of Representatives to ac-
company H.R. 3299, 101st Congress 1st Sess. 476-77 (Sept 20, 1989).
H.R. Conf. Rep. 101-386 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989,
Rep. to accompany H.R. 3299, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. 486 (Nov 21,
1989).
54 IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
67. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. Conf. Rep.
to accompany H.R. 3299, Rep. 101-386, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. 486
(Nov. 21, 1989).
68. The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act Pub.
L. No. 99-643, 100 Stat. 3574 (codified as amended in section 42 U.S.C.
§ 1305).
69. 20 C.FR. § et seq. (1988); P.O.M.S. SI 02302.010.1.
70. The breakeven point is the amount of earned income which would
reduce an SSI recipients cash benefit to zero. The Federal breakeven point
for an individual living alone in 1990 is $857. If the individual had not
worked, her Federal benefit would have been $386. But if she did work,
her SSI benefit would be reduced by $1 for every $2 of countable earned
income. In calculating the figure a general $20 income exclusion is ap-
plied as well as an earned income exclusion of $65. The breakeven point
in New York in 1990 is $1,029. It is arrived at by doubling the state sup-
plement and adding it to the federal level.
71,-PO.M.S. SI 02302.010.6.
72. 20 C.F.R. § 416.262(a) (1988).
73. 20 C.F.R. § 416.262(d) (1988).
74. Some states use more restrictive criteria for Medicaid eligibility
than the SSI program. §209(b) states are not required to provide auto-
matic Medicaid eligibility to SSI eligibles. Eligibility for §1619 is determined
under the State's criteria one month prior the individual became eligible
for §1619. 42 U.S.C § 1382h(b)(3) (1988); P.O.M.S. S 02302.01(c).
75. 20 C.F.R. § 416.261 (1988); P.O.M.S. SI 02302.010.11.
76. P.O.M.S. SI 02005.001.ff.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(h) (1988).
78. P.O.M.S. S 02302.045.
79. The 1989 New York threshold was $19,396. P.O.M.S. SI
02302.200E.1. The threshold amount for 1990 was attained through a
phone call to the the Social Security Administration. (far greater than SGA
annualized - $6,000.00, or actual SSI benefits for an individual living
alone - $6,696).
80. P.O.M.S. SI 02302.045.
81. $7,851 in 1990.
82. This figure is for an individual with no other income.
83. P.O.M.S. SI 02302.045a.
84. P.O.M.S. SI 00840.140; P.O.M.S. SI 00840.140.
85. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1180 (1988).
86. The test is as follows:
1. Has Medicaid coverage been used within the past
12 months?
2. Is Medicaid expected to be used in the next 12
months?
3. Would the individual's unexpected medical benefits
arise in the next twelve months so that the individual would
be unable to pay without Medicaid?
P.O.M.S. S 02302.040.
87. Before an SSI recipient can become eligible for §1619, they must
establish that they were eligible to receive a regular SSI cash payment
for a prior month within the current period of eligibility. P.O.M.S. SI
02302.025; P.O.M.S. SI 02302.010 b.
88. P.O.M.S. SI 02302.010 b.
89. Inherent in the nation's disability policies is a societal obligation
to work. Lawmakers are cautious in their efforts to define disability be-
cause they fear that liberalizing the definition may either undermine the
work ethic that drives our capitalist system, providing some workers with
a costly, premature retirement from the nation's workforce, or inadvertently
changing the scope and nature of government responsibility leading to
scores of new claimants. Tension is manifest when the public and legisla-
tors feel individuals are receiving benefits by avoiding their societal obli-
gation to work. Further, lawmakers have stressed their aversion to fostering
dependence on those with partial disabilities should the definition become
liberalized.
90. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid
Program, 33 Cath. U.L. Rev. 1 (1983).
91. The latest example of this paring process, in New York, is Gover-
nor Cuomds proposed requirement in his 1989-90 budget to require
recipients to pay part of their medical treatment. The Governor has pro-
posed a $350 million cut in Medicaid spending and a 15 percent reduc-
tion in in the rates paid to hospitals. Cross, Cuomo's 1989-90 Budget
A Taxing One, UPI release, Jan. 17, 1989.
92. Wing, supra note 90 at 10.
93. Id. at 11.
94. New pressures on Medicare may limit their access to medical
services. For example, between 1981 and 1986, Medicare's cost for doc-
tors' services has grown 40 percent faster than the economy as a whole
In 1985, Medicare Part B, was the fourth largest domestic spending pro-
gram ($19 billion); in 1988, it was the governments fastest-growing non-
defense program. Law, Negotiating Physicians' Fees: Individual Patients
or Society? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 2 (1986).
95. Lane, A Disability Primer, The New Republic, Aug. 12, 1985,
at 19.
96. Pear, Reagan Prepared to Stop Cuts in Disability, The New York
Times, Mar. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
97. Lane, supra note 95.
98. Pear, supra note 96.
99. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L No.
96-265,94 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 section U.S.C. § 1382h).
100. Id.
101. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L No. 98-460, 1984 Legislative History, 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 3047.
102. Lane, supra note 95, at 19 (32 percent per 1000 in 1967 to
16 percent in 1975).
103. 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3037, 3047
(160,000 starting in March 1981; 496,771 in 1982; and 640,000 in 1983.)
104. Of the approximately 2.3 million disability claims filed in fiscal
year 1981, over one-quarter-million required a hearing before an adminis-
trative law judge. See Dept. of Health and Human Services, Soc.
Sec. Annual Rep. to Cong. for Fiscal Year 1981, 32, 35 (1981).
105. 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3047.
106. Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F2d. 76, 78 (1986).
107. 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3038.
108. H.R. 3074, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
109. "We are hearing horror stories back in Washington about peo-
ple being driven to the brink of despair and beyond, because of the inhu-
manity of the disability review process. We are hearing that thousands
of honest and decent mentally disabled individuals are losing their benefits,
because of the Social Security Administration's blind, callous, and I be-
lieve illegal budget cutting"
In 1980, when Congress mandated that disability recipients be
reviewed every three years, it never intended a wholesale purge of the men-
tally disabled. It was guesstimated that perhaps 20 percent of the disabil-
ity beneficiaries were not entitled to benefits. But instead of 20 percent,
the Social Security Administration has so tightened its criteria that now
40 to 55 percent of claimants are being denied their just benefits.
One study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) has
found that of 1,400 cases it reviewed, 9 out of 10 individuals who were
denied and then appealed were ultimately reinstated" SSI Disability Is-
sues: Hearing on H.R. 3074 Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance
and Unemployment Compensatior Comm. on the Ways and Means, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 98-24 (1983) (opening prepared statement of Rep. Fort-
ney Stark).
110. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984,
Pub.LNo. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1974 (codified as amended at section 42
U.S.C.A. § 1382c(a)(5)).
111. Lane, supra note 95.
112. The SGA limit in 1978 was set at $240. Staff Data and Materi-
als on Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Disability Proposals, H.R.
12972 and HR. 10848, Subcomm. on Finance, Comm. on Finance 14
(1978).
113. The federal breakeven point for an individual living alone in 1978
was $443.
SPRING 1990
114. The Employment Opportunities for Disabled Americans Act:
Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, Soc. Security Bull.,
Na 3 (1987), 26 [hereinafter Summary Provisions].
115. H.R. 3464, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
116. Summary Provisions supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. 'The House-passed bill would have effectively and significantly
liberalized the basic definition of disability under the SSI program by chang-
ing the definition of what constitutes SGA... [Cihange in the definition
of disability could change the program from one in which benefits are in-
tended to be provided only for persons with disabilities generally consi-
dered severe enough to be considered total or near-total disabilities into
one in which benefits are also provided for partial disabilities... [T]he result
of the House bill could well be to increase dependency among less se-
verely disabled individuals:' The Social Security Disability Amendments
of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-265, Legislative History, U.S. Code & Cong.
Admin. News 1322.
119. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L
Na 96-265, § 201, 94 Stat 445 (codified as amended at 42 section U.S.C.
§ 1382).
120. The Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L
No 96-265, 94 Stat 445 (codified as amended at 42 section U.S.C. §
1382).
121. H.R. 3074, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.(1983).
122. Summary Provisions supra note 114.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub.
L No. 98-460, 98 Stat 1794. (codified as ammended at § 42 U.S.C.A.
1382c(a)(5)).
126. Department of Health and Human Services, Report
to the Congress: Implementation and Analysis of Public Law
98-460 - Section 1619, The Disability Benefits Reform Act
of 1984 (July 29, 1986) [hereinafter Dept. of HHS].
127. H.R. 6263, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
128. H.R. 2030, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
129. Hearing on HR. 2030 before the Subcomm. on Select Educa-
tion, Comm. on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-59 (1985)
(testimony by Patricia Owen, SSA) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2030].
130. Hearings on H.R. 2030 supra note 129.
131. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Income
Maintenance Programs, Comm. on Finance, 99 Cong., 2nd. Sess. (1986)
(testimony of Dorcas Hardy, Commissioner, SSA).
132. H.R. 8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
133. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, PL No. 101-239
§ 6012, 103 Stat 2161.
134. In June of 1987, there were 1,436 §1619 (a) SSI eligibles work-
ing. That figure rose to 12,752 in September of 1987, and to 14,559 in
December of 1987. In June of 1989, it rose to 22,212 disabled and work-
ing §1619 (a) participants. Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Sup-
plement, 1988, Table 9.13, p. 332. Phone call on March 1, 1990 to the
Supplemental Security Division of the Social Security Administration.
135. Participation in §1619 (b) has more than tripled since 1982 when
there were 5,515 participants. In June of 1989, there were 16,736 disa-
bled and working §1619 (b) participants. Social Security Bulletin, Annual
Statistical Supplement, 1988, Table 9.13 at 332.
136. 135 Cong. Rec. H9597-01 (Nov. 21, 1989) (testimony of Rep.
Steven Bartlett).
137. The following excerpt from a congressional report states the
new dilemma policy makers confront 'While Congress has found it neces-
sary and important to limit eligibility under these programs to those who
are so medically disabled that they cannot work, the Committee recog-
nizes that some individuals determined to meet the Social Security Act
definition of disability are nevertheless so motivated towards work and
independence that they later manage to work in spite of their impair-
ments... Allowing them to continue receiving income maintenance benefits
would seem to undermine the fundamental Congressional decision that
eligibility be limited to those that cannot work... On the other hand, ter-
minating benefits in such circumstances can be a powerful disincentive
to the work efforts which these severely disabled individuals are other-
wise motivated to attempt... By definition, these programs deal with In-
dividuals who have limited resources to fall back on should their work
attempts fail or prove insufficient to meet their medical and other needs."
S. Rep. No. 466,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 132, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 6087, 6088.
From December 1982 to August 1985 participation in §1619(b) rose
from 5,515 to 7,954, while participation in §1619(a) rose from 287 to 817
participants. This was during a time when reliance upon the law could
have left persons without vital benefits since it was set to expire in 1987;
it was also a time when SSA was deeply criticized by advocates for not
informing recipients of their legal rights. Clearly, disabled program recipient
want work. Dept. of HHS supra note 126.
138. Under the SSI program alone, there is potential for Increased
participation that could lead to significant taxpayer savings. One half a
million recipients, or nearly 20 percent of all persons on the current SSI
caseload, have posted some earnings since applying for SSI, However,
the percentage of those working disabled currently participating In §1619
is far lower than 20 percent - in 1985, for example, average monthly
participation was 0.2 percent of all disabled SSI individuals. Dept. of HHS
supra note 126, at 11.
139. In support of making the section permanent the Commission-
er of the Social Security Administration stated: "Senator Doles proposal
to make §1619 permanent is a desirable change. It is an opportunity for
disabled persons to achieve their potential, and gives them even more In-
centive to work... Work incentives are not always found In public pro.
grams, and I think that this is a very positive step in that direction! Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Social Security and Income Maintenance Pro-
grams, Comm. on Finance, 99 Cong., 2nd. Sess. (1986) (testimony of
Dorcas Hardy, Commissioner, SSA).
140. See SSI Disability Issues: Hearings on H.R. 3074 Before the
Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation,
Comm. on the Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-24 (1983) (tes-
timony by disability advocate Greg Sanders).
141. When Congress created the SSD program in 1956, for exam-
ple, it estimated that by 1980 it would be paying $85 million a year to
one million beneficiaries. However, in 1984 SSD transferred $17 billion
to 3.8 million Americans. Lane, supra note 95.
142. In 1987, 33 percent of the SSD eligibles were under age forty-
five 135 Cong. Rec. E14-01 (Jan. 3, 1989) (testimony of Rep. Steve
Bartlett).
143. 20 C.F.R. § 416.421 (1988).
144. 135 Cong. Rec. E14-01 (Jan. 3, 1989) (testimony of Rep. Steve
Bartlett).
IN THE PUBUC INTEREST
